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ABSTRACT 
The Asymmetrical Software Kit (ASK) is a software package built for U.S Army 
Special Operations Command (USASOC).  It is designed to greatly expand and digitize 
the Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB) process for Special Forces units.  The 
purpose of this Thesis is to thoroughly evaluate the Tactical user’s acceptance of this 
technological innovation.  Technology Acceptance Model, which psychometrically 
measures users’ perceptions of ease-of-use and utility to predict their intention to use the 
software, was applied in this analysis.  The test population for this user acceptance survey 
is the Tactical (Group and below) level user of the ASK.  These are the Special Forces 
Intel Sergeants (18Fs) on the Special Forces A-Teams (ODAs), and the Military 
Intelligence personnel at the Battalion and Group S2 (Staff Intelligence) sections.  
Respondents completed an anonymous, online survey on their impressions of the ASK.  
The questions were focused on system usability and user acceptance in a military setting.  
Overall, the models used in this study showed an acceptable level of fit with the Tactical 
end-user’s usability and acceptance assessments and exhibited satisfactory explanatory 
power.  Users showed marked trends in response to questions concerning training, 
command involvement, and system availability.  Qualitative input included a number of 
responses about the idiosyncrasies of certain programs, and the lack of high speed 
computers to run complex GIS queries.  The findings from this study should provide 
some valuable insights to Program Managers about systems evaluation, and clarify how 
USASOC can design full spectrum software fielding to foster technology acceptance and 
use at the Tactical level. 
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A. BACKGROUND AND MOTIVATION 
The Asymmetrical Software Kit (ASK) was designed using commercial off-the-
shelf (COTS) software and hardware to aid the collection, processing, and dissemination 
of Military Intelligence in Army Special Operations units.  The changing nature of 
warfare necessitated a newer, more agile analytic system to face newer, more agile foes.  
The Global War on Terror (GWOT) has highlighted the necessity for replacing legacy 
Intel systems like the All Source Analysis System (ASAS) and its younger sibling, the 
ASAS-Light.  These systems, designed to operate in the Corps and Division Analysis and 
Control Elements (ACE), were left over from the Cold War.  According to Army FM 34-
25-3, the ASAS “is a "linchpin" system in forming a seamless intelligence architecture 
between and across echelons. They form a system that supports commanders from 
tactical through strategic levels anywhere across the range of military operations.”1      
 
  
Figure 1.   Army Intel Architecture and ASAS 
                                                 





Engineered to process information on Warsaw Pact threats and push finished 
intelligence from Corps and Division analytic elements down to Brigade and below, they 
were wholly unsuited to the nature of the asymmetric and complicated threat encountered 
by Special Operations Forces in the GWOT.  Most Intelligence requirements and 
procedures for SOF and conventional forces are the same. Yet, given the uniqueness of 
SOF missions and roles, there are characteristics of intelligence support that require 
unique systems and approaches. According to Army FM 3-05.102, Army Special 
Operations Forces Intelligence these are— 
• Level of detail. The intricate planning and decentralized execution of SOF 
missions require intelligence support that is frequently more detailed or specific than that 
needed in conventional operations. ARSOF often require intelligence to avoid enemy 
forces, regardless of size or composition, as opposed to information that would allow 
conventional forces to directly engage the enemy. 
• Timeliness and accuracy of information. Timely and accurate intelligence and 
unprocessed combat information can be a significant factor in operational success. Given 
the high risk factor or criticality of many ARSOF missions, uncertainty about the threat 
or environment reduces the chances for success more so than in the case of large-scale 
conventional operations. Equal with the need for accurate information is the need for 
timely information. Often the success of an ARSOF mission hinges upon having a key bit 
of knowledge at a specific time or event. 
• Operational element and analyst interface. Given the sensitivity and critical 
need for very detailed information, especially in the context of DA operations, 
intelligence personnel often need to work directly with the forces that will execute a 
mission. Frequently both analysts and collectors will work hand in hand with operational 
planners and even with those executing the actual mission during planning, rehearsal, 
execution, and post-operational phases of a mission. Because ARSOF units often use 
forward staging bases, assigned intelligence personnel must be familiar with the conduct 




intelligence “packages” and to maintain connectivity with the Intelligence and Electronic 
Warfare (IEW) system through communications with their higher HQ.2 
For SOF in an asymmetric fight, the legacy systems like ASAS failed because 
they are not able to meet the unique Intelligence needs critical to SOF mission success.  
The Asymmetrical Software Kit (ASK) was specifically commissioned to confront this 
change in the Military Intelligence paradigm that Army Special Operators were 
confronting in the GWOT. 
To meet the needs of the Special Forces Intelligence Sergeant, or 18F on the 
Special Forced Operational Detachment Alpha (ODA), the ASK was originally 
developed by cobbling together 3 COTS software programs -  Analyst’s Notebook 
(ANB), Orion Magic (OM), and ArcGIS.  These SOF peculiar Intelligence needs were 
calculated as being able to mine data (OM), analyze networks (ANB), and analyze and 
display data geospatially.  In 2002, nothing existed in the military inventory.  The Special 
Forces Intelligence Sergeant Course (SFISC) committee at the John F. Kennedy Special 
Warfare Center and School (SWCS) built their own package and insinuated it into the 
curriculum of the SFISC.  The initial successes with the system and the analysis the 18F’s 
performed as part of their capstone exercise in the course began to be showcased to 
visiting dignitaries and General Officers.  The software package quickly became fast 
tracked for acquisition and purchase by United States Army Special Operations 
Command (USASOC).  In 2004, fielding to individual Special Forces, Civil Affairs, and 
other SOF units began.3 
Six years into the GWOT, and three years since the ASK’s initial fielding, 
evidence from the battlefield suggests that ASK may not be all that it forecast to be.  In 
light of this evidence and the resulting concerns, it is appropriate to evaluate the ASK 
software package by focusing on those US military personal who that have used in on the  
 
 
                                                 
2 Army FM 3-05.102, “Army Special Operations Forces Intelligence,” July 2001, pp. 2-5. 




battlefield.   The most important question before us is simple.  Is ASK really working for 
American soldiers, and can we measure and quantify this through perceived ease of use 
and perceived utility? 
To date, most Information Technology (IT) research has concentrated on user 
acceptance factors in a business environment.  In a market economy, there are a myriad 
of factors that encourage groups/ users to accept  innovations.   In a government 
economy, those factors differ greatly.  According to Chau and Hu4 and Lin5, the 
proliferation of innovative technologies that support individuals performing highly 
specialized tasks (like Intelligence Analysis) in the government sector is one area that 
needs additional research into technology acceptance decision-making. 
Investigations of technology usability and acceptance among tactical level (the 
soldiers on the pointy end of the spear) users have received precious little attention in 
previous research.  In response, this project aims to examine user acceptance and 
usability of the ASK, across tactical Army SOF units.  This study describes the design 
and implementation of a user-centric evaluation targeting system usability and user 
acceptance. 
B PROBLEM STATEMENT 
The ASK, fielded at the cost of millions of dollars, was designed to seamlessly 
integrate intelligence up, down, and across the Tactical levels of command.  Anecdotally, 
the system has had major problems with full adoption.  Users routinely leave the software 
and hardware in the rear when they deploy, or, at best, only deploy and use certain pieces 
of the system in the capacity they were designed for, leaving many powerful tools 
unused.6   Why? 
                                                 
4 Chau, P.Y.K. and Hu, P.J.-H. “Examining a model of information technology acceptance by 
individual professionals: An exploratory study,” Journal of Management Information Systems, 18(4), 2002, 
pp. 191-229. 
5 Chienting Lin, Examining Technology Usability and Acceptance in Digital Government: A Case 
Study in Law Enforcement, Doctoral Dissertation, University of Arizona, 2004. 
6 These scenarios came to light during the authors experience as an Intelligence Officer at 3rd Special 





C RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
Evidence suggests the Asymmetrical Software Kit is so complex, and the train-up 
is so daunting, that (as predicted by the Technology Acceptance Model), tactical users 
perceived utility, acceptance, and use of the system is low.  If this is demonstrably true, 
how can we improve the software product to increase perceived value and ease of use 
thereby leading to a high level of user acceptance and use? 
D INVESTIGATIVE QUESTIONS 
1.  Is ASK being accepted and used by tactical level producers and consumers of 
intelligence in USASFC (as measured by their survey responses)? 
2.  With regards to ease of use, what, according to the tactical level users, are the 
problems endemic with the ASK?  Do they relate to ease of use, social issues, or system 
availability?  
3.  How can we increase user acceptance and use of these types of software 
systems?? 
a. What is the impact of increased training on user acceptance and use (18F 
Program of Instruction versus New Equipment Training)? 
b. Are there other alternatives (COTS/GOTS software) that contain attributes 
that will increase perceived value and ease of use? What are those attributes 
independent of a particular alternative? 
c. How can we better plan for and manage technology acquisition to increase 
acceptance and use? 
E RESEARCH FOCUS 
There are many different types of collaborative intelligence software that is being 
used in both the private (financial analysis) and government (national intelligence 
agencies) sectors.  The focus of this research will be a thorough analysis of the factors 




by Army Special Operations units at the Tactical level.  The results will be the statistical 
output derived from a proven theoretical model (Technology Acceptance Model) used to 
predict future usage of new Information Technology (IT) and specific user-input for 
improvements on the current and future systems the service will field. 
F METHODOLOGY 
To answer the key research questions, a case study will be performed to identify 
specific factors that impact user acceptance and usage of the ASK.  This case study will 
be based on a comprehensive literature review and interviews with tactical level users at 
Ft. Bragg, NC.  These findings will be used to construct the survey instrument used 
during the case study.  A thorough statistical analysis of the survey data and user 
suggestions will be used to make suggestions for improvements to the current system, 
and generate requirements for fielding of future systems. 
G SCOPE 
The scope of this research effort will be to explore the numerous factors 
impacting acceptance and use of the Asymmetrical Software Kit among the tactical level 
users.  To accomplish this, the research will review existing literature and studies to 
identify factors affecting participation in other forms of collaborative intelligence 
software.  The goal of this will be to identify the key elements of gaining user “buy in” 
and participation in collaborative intelligence programs.  The results will potentially be 
used to help modify and manage the existing intelligence systems, and assist in the 
design, implementation, and fielding of future software packages. 
H LIMITATIONS 
The limitations of this research include the small sample population (+/-300) of 
ASK users at the tactical level in USASOC units.  This is due to the nature of the case 
study itself.  Outside factors have a limiting factor on respondents.  USASOC units are 




contact with an already small population even more difficult.  In addition, this project is 
only studying the Asymmetrical Software Kit at the tactical level.  As a result of this, the 
results of this study may not be applicable beyond the USASOC community or to IT 








II.  LITERATURE REVIEW 
A. OVERVIEW 
This thesis research attempts to identify the factors affecting user acceptance of 
the Asymmetrical Software Kit (ASK) based on the theories of the Technology 
Acceptance Model (TAM).  The scope of this review represents the learned opinions of 
numerous experts and academics from different books and journals pertaining to 
technology acceptance and use of Information Technologies (IT).  The information in this 
literature review will attempt to explain the components and function of the ASK as well 
as the pertinent factors that affect technology acceptance and adoption. 
B. THE ASYMMETRICAL SOFTWARE KIT 
The ASK consists of three COTS software components: ArcGIS, Analyst’s 
Notebook, and Orion Magic.  Each component serves as an integral piece of the 
Intelligence analysis that tactical users do on a continuous basis.  The amount of data the 
average 18F takes in has increased exponentially in the information age.  These software 
tools allow the SF Intelligence Sergeant and the Military Intelligence analysts he interacts 
with at the Special Forces Battalion and Group levels to quickly store, process, analyze, 
and visualize unprecedented amounts of information.  The three components each work 
in their own way to facilitate this process.   
Data collection and organization is the job of SRA Incorporated’s Orion Magic 
(OM) software.  OM is a “single framework for data collection, mining, and distribution. 
OM is a suite of tools developed to support investigative processes, from data collection 
to statistical analyses, to results visualization.7  Users can logically organize incoming 
data in a hierarchical format of cabinets, outlines, and notecards to speed up subsequent 
data mining efforts.  OM is also equipped with a powerful search engine to search the 
data analysts have organized.  Their “Matrix Search” feature “is a series of vertical 
                                                 




column cells and horizontal row cells, each containing one or more keywords, (or 
concepts) that can be applied to the web, documents or databases and return results for 
not only each cell but also the intersection of those cells.”8   Searching and displaying 
intersecting data in a format like this allows analysts to quickly visualize a few, 
significant intersecting data points in a mass of information. 
 
 9  
Figure 2.   File Cabinets and Outlines in Orion Magic 
                                                 
8 Orion Magic website, http://www.orionmagic.com/search.htm, accessed 19 September 2007.  






Figure 3.   Matrix Search results in OM 
 
Geo-visualization and analysis of data is another critical task for the SF 
Intelligence Sergeant and the MI analysts that support him.  This is accomplished using a 
Geospatial Information System (GIS). “A Geographic Information System (GIS) is a 
system for the management, analysis, and display of geographic information.  Geographic 
information is represented by a series of geographic databases that model geography 
using simple, generic data structures.” 11  GIS is also defined as “an integrated system of 
computer hardware, software, and trained personnel linking topographic, demographic, 
utility, facility, image and other resource data that is geographically referenced.” 12 
ArcGIS is a product of ESRI, a leading software company in the GIS business. In 
the ASK, ArcGIS includes: ArcReader, which allows the user to view and query maps 
created with the other Arc products; ArcView, which allows users to view spatial data, 
create maps, and perform basic spatial analysis; ArcEditor which includes all the 
                                                 
10Image downloaded from Orion Magic website, http://www.orionmagic.com/search.htm, on 19 Sep 
2007. 
11 ESRI white paper, “What is ArcGIS?,” 2004, accessed on 21 Aug 2007 at 
http://downloads.esri.com/support/documentation/ao_/698What_is_ArcGIS.pdf . 





functionality of ArcView, includes more advanced tools for manipulation of shapefiles 
and geodatabases; or ArcInfo the most advanced version of ArcGIS, which includes 
added capabilities for data manipulation, editing, and analysis. To increase the 
functionality of ArcGIS, special Military “Extensions” have been created to 
accommodate military operational symbols, military grid referencing systems (MGRS) 
and digital terrain elevation data (DTED).13 
 
Figure 4.   Data table in MS Excel format 
                                                 
13 ESRI website, http://www.esri.com/software/arcgis/extensions/militaryanalyst/index.html. accessed 





Figure 5.   Data graphically displayed and overlaid on mapping 
 
Analyst’s Notebook (ANB) is social network analysis software from the I2 
Corporation.  It allows analysts to process, analyze, and graphically display immense 
amounts of data on networks.  The Analyst's Notebook also enables analysts to prepare 
and share link-analysis charts. Figure 6 shows a sample link analysis chart (finished 
intelligence) from ANB. SOF Intelligence analysts use ANB to identify links between 
known or suspected terrorists, their activities, phone numbers, locations, and their 
associations with other persons, events, or groups.  With ANB, data trends and linkages 
can be visually displayed, interpreted, and subsequently analyzed. 
                                                 
14 Images downloaded from ESRI Website,  





Figure 6.   Sample Link Analysis Chart 
 
C. TECHNOLOGY ACCEPTANCE THEORIES 
In the following sections, the preeminent theories on technology acceptance and 
adoption will be reviewed.  Classical Diffusion of Innovation (DOI) theory and the 
leading intention-based theories that provide theoretical underpinnings of this study will 
be the main focus.  
D. DIFFUSION OF INNOVATION 
The model of “diffusion of innovation” was proposed by Everett Rogers in 1962.  
It was originally used by rural sociologists to study the diffusion of agricultural 
                                                 
15 Image downloaded from I2 corporate website,  




technologies in social systems, but it has stood the test of time and been very successfully 
applied to information technology products.16 
According to Rogers, innovation is “an idea, practice, or object perceived as new 
by an individual or other unit of adoption”17 and diffusion is “the process by which an 
innovation is communicated through certain channels over time and among the members 
of a social system.” 18  Rogers used well-established theories in sociology, psychology, 
and communications to develop a clear and succinct approach to explaining the diffusion 
of innovations. 
19 
Figure 7.   Innovation Adoption Curve 
 
After its conception, an innovation spreads slowly at first - usually through the 
campaigning of change agents - then picks up speed and visibility as more and more 
                                                 
16 E. Mustonen-Ollila, & K. Lyytinen, (2003). Why Organizations Adopt Information System Process 
Innovations: A Longitudinal Study using Diffusion of Innovation Theory, Information Systems Journal, 
13(3), pp.  275-297. 
17 Everett M. Rogers, Diffusion of Innovation, New York, Free Press, 2003, p. 12. 
18 Everett M. Rogers, Diffusion of Innovation, New York: Free Press, 2003, p.  35. 
19 Image downloaded from Tulane University website,  http://www.payson.tulane.edu/research/E-




people are exposed to and adopt the innovation. Eventually it reaches a saturation level, 
where nearly everyone who is going to adopt the innovation, minus the hardcore luddites, 
has done so. 
Individuals within a social system do not all adopt an innovation at the same time, 
but rather in an over-time sequence, so that individuals can be classified into adopter 
categories based on when they begin using an innovation.  Socioeconomic and individual 
personality characteristics define the individual’s role in the diffusion process.  These 
adopter roles are: innovators (2.5%), early adopters (13.5%), early majority (34%), late 
majority (34%), and laggards (16%). 
 
20 
Figure 8.   Adopter Categorization on the Basis of Innovativeness 
 
After the forward-thinking change agents have adopted the innovation, they work 
to communicate it to others in the society by whatever means they believe appropriate. 
When the number of early adopters reaches a “critical mass” - between 5 and 15% - the 
process becomes self-sustaining, as more and more people talk about or demonstrate the  
 
                                                 




innovation to each other.21   Innovation diffusion theorists have identified five perceived 
attributes22 that explain why some innovations reach this tipping point and others never 
do.   They are: 
Relative Advantage - Is the innovation better than the status quo? Will people 
perceive it as better?  If not, the innovation will not spread quickly, if at all. 
Compatibility - How does the innovation fit with people's past experiences and 
present needs?  If it doesn't fit both well, it won't spread well. Does it require a change in 
existing values?  If members of the culture feel as though they have to become very 
different people to adopt the innovation, they will be more resistant to it. 
Complexity - How difficult is the innovation to understand and apply?  The more 
difficult the innovation is to grasp, the slower the adoption process. 
Trialability - Can potential adopters "try out" the innovation first, or must they 
commit to it all at once?  If the latter, people will be far more cautious about adopting it. 
Observability - How visible/tangible are the benefits of adoption?  If people adopt 
it, can the difference be discerned by others?  If not, the innovation will spread more 
slowly.23 
E. INTENTION-BASED ACCEPTANCE THEORY 
Technology Acceptance Modeling (TAM) builds on Rogers’ research on patterns 
of diffusion by providing a reliable method for predicting user behavior.  Three models 
have evolved to successfully explain actual system use by measuring users’ perceptions 
towards the innovation.  These are the Theory of Reasoned Action (TRA), Theory of 
Planned Behavior (TPB), and Technology Acceptance Model (TAM). 
According to Fishbein and Ajzen’s TRA, people’s beliefs influence their attitudes, 
which together with subjective norms shape their behavior intentions.  This then guides 
or dictates their actual behavior.  In numerous studies, intention and actual behavior have 
                                                 
21 Everett M. Rogers, Diffusion of Innovation, New York, Free Press, 2003, p. 344. 
22 Perception of adopter is key in Technology Acceptance Model (TAM) discussed under intention-
based theories.  DOI is the antecedent to TAM. 




been shown to be correlated highly.  TRA has been applied scientifically to explain a 
wide variety of behaviors, including consumer purchasing24, condom usage25, and breast 
self-examination.26  TRA forms the basis for the Technology Acceptance Model 
ultimately selected for use in this study. 
 
 
Figure 9.    Theory of Reasoned Action27 
Icek Ajzen’s Theory of Planned Behavior (TPB) posits that attitudes towards 
behavior and the subjective norm from TRA are insufficient to explain behavioral 
intentions.  TBP introduces yet another factor, Perceived Behavioral Control (PBC) to the 
mix.  PBC measures of the amount of control people perceive they have over their own 
behavior.  As a general rule, the more favorable the attitude toward behavior and 
subjective norm, and the greater the perceived behavioral control, the stronger the 
person’s intention to perform the behavior in question should be.  Finally, given a 
sufficient degree of actual control over the behavior, people are expected to carry out 
their intentions when the opportunity arises. 28 
 
                                                 
24B. H. Sheppard., J. Hartwick, J.& P. R.Warshaw, The theory of reasoned action: A meta-analysis of 
past research with recommendations for modifications and future research, Journal of Consumer Research, 
vol 15, 1988, p. 325. 
25 Y. Kashima, C Gallois, & M. McCamish, The theory of reasoned action and cooperative behaviour: 
it takes two to use a condom, British Journal of Social Psychology, 1993 Sep;32 ( Pt 3): pp. 227-39 . 
26 L. M. Lierman, H. M. Young, D. Kasprzyk, & J. Q. Benoliel, Predicting breast self-examination 
using the theory of reasoned action, Nursing Research, 1990 Mar-Apr;39(2): pp. 97-101. 
27 Image downloaded from Your University website 
http://www.istheory.yorku.ca/theoryofreasonedaction.htm on 07 Dec 2007. 
28 I. Ajzen, Residual Effects of Past on Later Behavior: Habituation and Reasoned Action 





Figure 10.   Theory of Planned Behavior, from Environmental Health Journal. 
   
Fred Davis proposed Technology Acceptance Model (TAM) in 1989 as a logical 
extension of TRA and TPB.  TAM theorizes that the two main beliefs determining 
attitude and behavioral intention are perceived usefulness (PU) and perceived ease of use 
(PEOU).  USE is defined as the degree to which a user believes that the system he is 
adopting will enhance his or her performance.  PEOU refers to the degree to which a user 
believes that using the new system will be free from physical and mental effort.30  The 
goal of TAM is to predict and explain user acceptance of Information Technology (IT) 
across a wide range of technologies, organizational contexts, and user populations.  
Given a choice between two systems, users will generally rate the system they find easier 
to use as having a higher PEOU score.  TAM has been used successfully in numerous 
studies.  Davis, Bagozzi, and Warshaw were able to successfully predict usage of a word-
processing program in a class of graduate students31, and Dillon and Morris had similar 
results predicting usage of a web-browser among computer science students.32  The basic 
TAM model is depicted below. 
                                                 
29 Image downloaded from Environmental Health Journal at  
http://www.ehjournal.net/content/4/1/23/figure/F1 on 28 Sep 2007.  
30Fred Davis, Perceived usefulness, perceived ease of use, and user acceptance of information 
technology. MIS Quarterly, 13(3), 1989,  pp. 319-340.  
31 Fred Davis, R. P.Bagozzi, & P. R. Warshaw, User Acceptance of Computer Technology: A 
Comparison of Two Theoretical Models, Management Science, 35(8), 1989, pp. 982-1003. 
32 A. Dillon  & M. Morris, User Acceptance of Information Technology: Theories and Models, Annual 





Figure 11.   Technology Acceptance Model 
 
F. EVALUATION METHOD SELECTION 
After researching the three models presented (TRA, TPB, and TAM), it was 
determined that TAM would best be able to predict future usage of the ASK for three 
reasons:  (1) TAM’s legitimacy is firmly grounded in the literature of psycho-social 
sciences, (2) TAM was specifically developed to explain and predict user acceptance of 
technological innovations like the ASK, and (3) TAM’s ability to predict system usage 
with a minimum amount of cost and difficulty are ideal for a study like this.  
G. THE RESEARCH MODEL 
To date, only Chienting Lin, Paul Hu, and Hsinchun Chen have looked at usage of 
Intelligence and Security Informatics (ISI) systems (specifically the COPLINK system 
used by the Tucson PD) based on the Technology Acceptance Model.34  The model for 
this study is drawn from that work, and is an attempt to further validate their findings in a 
similar (military versus police) environment. 
                                                 
33M. Morris & A. Dillon, How User Perceptions Influence Software Use. IEEE Software, 14(4), 1997, 
pp. 58-65..  
34 Paul Hu, Chienting Lin,.& H. Chen, User acceptance of Intelligence and Security Informatics 
technology: A study of COPLINK, Journal of the American Society for Information Science and 















































Figure 12.   Asymmetrical Software Kit User Acceptance Study Research Model 
 
Research suggests that a user’s decision to accept or refuse an ISI technology can 
be explained by factor pertaining to the technological, social, and organizational contexts.  
By examining these three factors, one can determine the roots of some of the barriers to 
adoption in a community of users.   
The core principles of the technological context are perceived usefulness (PU), 
perceived ease of use (PEOU).  For this study, PEOU and PU both determine attitude, 
and PEOU has a direct and positive effect on PU.  Efficiency gain is an extremely 
important component in the Special Operations community: SOF peculiar intelligence 
requirements are, as previously noted in Chapter 1, Level of Detail, Timeliness and 
accuracy of information, and Operational element and analyst interface.  Intelligence 
analysts at the tactical level continuously work against the clock to process, analyze, and 
disseminate intelligence from an ever increasing torrent of raw information.  





H1:  The level of efficiency gain of the ASK as perceived by the tactical users 
will positively affect their perceived usefulness of the ASK. 
H2: The level of job relevance of the ASK as perceived by the tactical users will 
positively affect their perceived usefulness of the ASK. 
H3: The level of product quality of the ASK as perceived by the tactical users will 
positively affect their perceived usefulness of the ASK. 
H4: The level of external data access of the ASK as perceived by the tactical users 
will positively affect their perceived usefulness of the ASK. 
Perceived Ease of Use 
H5: The level of external data connectivity of the ASK as perceived by the 
tactical users will positively affect their perceived ease of use of the ASK. 
H6: The level of functionality of the ASK as perceived by the tactical users will 
positively affect their perceived ease of use of the ASK. 
H7: The level of learnability of the ASK as perceived by the tactical users will 
positively affect their perceived ease of use of the ASK. 
Through system exposure in training and daily job usage, users in the research 
population have developed personal assessments of, and attitudinal beliefs about the 
ASK.  According to TAM and TPB, individuals embracing a positive attitude towards an 
innovation are more likely to accept that technology than those displaying a negative 
attitude.  While others have questioned the effectiveness of attitude in mediating PEOU 
and PUs impact on Behavioral Intent35, like Hu, Lin, and Chen, this study has elected to 
retain attitude because of the considerable autonomy afforded Military Intelligence 
analysts and SF Intelligence Sergeants.   
                                                 
35 Fred Davis, Richard Bagozzi,  & P. Warshaw, User Acceptance of Computer Technology: A 




In the Social context of this study, subjective norm refers to the user’s assessment 
or perception of his significant referents’ desires or opinions regarding his or her 
acceptance of the ASK.  In the military, this is the user’s peer group and his immediate 
chain of command.  In the military, as in the law-enforcement community Lin studied, 
soldiers form psychological attachments to their unit and to the social system within it.36   
This attachment, in the military context, can be attributed to personal commitment to 
public service, the sense of community in military units, and the great amount to which 
soldiers depend on each other in an increasingly dangerous environment.  In this study, 
we measured that by looking at Peer Influence (PEER).  Given these factors, a military 
user is especially likely to consider the ASK useful and exhibit a strong intention to 
accept it when his fellow analysts and his leaders are in favor of adopting the innovation.  
Since there is a hierarchy in the profession, a military user is also likely to take into 
consideration the wants and needs of his supervisors.  This is measured in the Chain of 
Command (COC) portion of the survey.   
Subjective Norm 
H8: The level of peer influence (PEER) as perceived by the tactical users will 
positively affect the intensity of their perceived subjective norm towards accepting the ASK. 
H9: The level of command (COC) involvement as perceived by the tactical users will 
positively affect the intensity of their perceived subjective norm towards accepting the ASK. 
System availability (AV), Training (TNG), and Support (SPT) are key 
components of the organizational context.  System availability refers to the users 
perception of the availability of equipment necessary for accessing and using the ASK.  
Resource availability is a fundamental construct of perceived behavioral control, a 
component of Ajzen’s TPB.  In Determinants of Perceived Use, Venkatesh specifically 
notes the effect of availability of resources and opportunities on user acceptance.37  In 
                                                 
36 Chienting Lin, Examining Technology Usability and Acceptance in Digital Government: A Case 
Study in Law Enforcement, University of Arizona, 2004, p.75. 
37 V. Venkatesh, Determinants of Perceived Ease of Use: Integrating Control, Intrinsic Motivation, 




addition to the previous research, the subjects of system speed, technical support, and 
computer availability were prevalent themes in pre-study interviews conducted with users 
at Ft. Bragg.  There is also a large difference in the training that SOF and MI MOS 
soldiers receive on the system.  In light of that information, the study tested the following 
hypotheses. 
Behavioral Intent 
H10: The level of system availability as perceived by the tactical users will positively 
affect the intensity of their behavioral intention towards accepting the ASK. 
H11: The quality of training as perceived by the tactical users will positively affect 
the intensity of their behavioral intention towards accepting the ASK. 
H12: The level of support as perceived by the tactical users will positively affect the 








This chapter describes the overall methodology of this research project.  The 
design of the qualitative study will be covered in depth to illustrate the processes and 
procedures used to perform the case study in this research project. 
B. TAM IMPLEMENTATION 
The following steps were derived from a comprehensive reading of previous 
research: (1) identify an appropriate study group, (2) develop /design the survey 
instrument, (3) gather data, (4) analyze the data, and (5) draw the appropriate 
conclusions.  The following is a discussion of how these steps were implemented. 
C. IDENTIFY STUDY GROUP PARTICIPANTS 
The population of the study consists entirely of Military Intelligence personnel, 
Special Forces Intelligence Sergeants, and Civil Affairs Soldiers assigned to United 
States Army Special Operations Command (USASOC).  They represent several different 
Special Forces Groups, the JFK Special Warfare Center and School, the 96th Civil Affairs 
Brigade, and soldiers in various subordinate headquarters units.  These soldiers all have 
experience with the Asymmetrical Software Kit, and use it, or components of it, in the 
course of their analyst duties.  They represent a broad range of ages, experience, job 
training, and education. 
D. INSTRUMENT DEVELOPMENT 
Multiple techniques were used during the instrument development phase.  




studies conducted on COPLINK by Lin, Hu and Chen38 and previous research done by 
Lin39 provided a readily validated survey instrument.  The survey questions were drawn 
from this work, and then modified to reflect a change in communities (from police to 
military) and lexicons.  After these changes, two Soldiers from the Ft. Bragg study group, 
and one Special Forces officer at the Naval Postgraduate School voluntarily assessed the 
validity of the resulting items at face value.  From their input, a few minor changes were 
made to tailor the survey to the community.  All question items (refer to Appendix B, 
survey questionnaire) were measured using a seven-point Likert scale.  The possible 
response ranged from “strongly agree” to “strongly disagree.”  Multiple questions were 
used to measure single variables to compensate for how subjects respond to questions 
with certain word structures.  To reduce the incidence of monotonous responses on the 
survey, the sequence of questions was randomized and half of the questions were 
negated. 
E. DATA COLLECTION 
The study empirically tested the research model using data collected from a self-
administered, online survey.  The link to the website was distributed to over 350 
participants through their chains of command.  All subjects participated in the study 
voluntarily.  The website with the survey was kept open for eight weeks, from 13 
September 2007 to 12 November 2007 to allow as many subjects, given the current unit 
operational tempo and competing deployments, to reply as possible.  Of the Soldiers that 
it was emailed to, 38 initiated the survey on the website.  Of those 38 hits, 25 produced 
useable data. 
The survey was designed to collect both qualitative and quantitative data.  The 
constructs were measured using a seven point Likert Scale, with one as “Strongly 
                                                 
38 Paul Hu, Chienting Lin, & H. Chen, User acceptance of Intelligence and Security Informatics 
technology: A study of COPLINK, Journal of the American Society for Information Science and 
Technology, 2005; 56(3) p. 235-244. 
39 Chienting Lin, Examining Technology Usability and Acceptance in Digital Government: A Case 




Disagree” and seven as “Strongly Agree.”  See Table 1 below for a sample question from 
the survey with the accompanying seven point Likert Scale below it.  Multiple questions 
were used to measure single variables, allowing for variation in how individuals respond 
to varying word structures.  The process of determining which sets of questions exhibit 
the smallest amount of variance for a particular variable is called Reliability Analysis.  
Reliability is calculated using a statistical procedure to measure Cronbach’s Alpha.40  
Cronbach Alpha ranges between 0.0 and 1.0, and value of greater than 0.7 is considered 
sufficient for social research. 
 





























Table 1.   Sample Survey Question41 
 
In his initial research on TAM, Fred Davis performed this measure on each of his 
four variables, Perceived Utility (PU), Perceived Ease of Use (PEOU), Attitude (ATT) 
towards using, and Behavioral Intent to use (BI), to ascertain their reliability.  His four 
measures of PU achieved a reliability score of 0.92, and PEOU achieved 0.90.  The ATT 
scale and BI scale obtained reliability scores of 0.82 and 0.92 respectively.42  The same 
analysis was repeated on the data gathered for this study to ensure reliability. 
                                                 
40L. Cronbach, Coefficient alpha and the internal structure of tests. Psychometrika, 16(3), 1951, pp. 
297-334.  
41 V. Venkatesh and F. Davis, A Model of Antecedents of Perceived Ease of Use: Development and 
Test.  Decision Sciences, 27(3) 1996, pp. 451-481. 
42 V. Venkatesh, and F. Davis, A Model of Antecedents of Perceived Ease of Use: Development and 




In addition to the TAM constructs investigated by Davis, this study also 
investigates users perceptions of system Functionality (FUNC), available Tech Support 
(SPT), the importance of External Connectivity (EXCON), Efficiency Gain (EG) and the 
Training (TNG) they have received on the system.  These questions were modeled after 
the studies on user acceptance of COPLINK conducted by Lin.43 
To assess the qualitative aspect of the survey, three open ended questions were 
asked at the end of the survey.  Respondents were elicited for their input on what part of 
the system worked well, what needed fixing, and their suggestions for future 
improvements.  A sample of their input is included in Chapter IV. 
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IV RESULTS AND ANALYSIS 
A. OVERVIEW 
This chapter presents the results of the research study in four distinct sections: 
Instrument Validation, Respondent Demographics, Qualitative Feedback, and 
Quantitative Analysis.   The survey instrument was validated using Reliability Analysis.  
The subsequent sections examine respondent demographics; summarize some user- 
generated qualitative feedback about the system, and statistically analyze the survey data 
to find correlations to the model. 
B. INSTRUMENT VALIDATION 
Most of the items in this survey were drawn from previously validated 
measurements, but this study re-examines the instrument’s convergent and discriminate 
validity.  Using the responses from the survey, the instrument’s convergent validity was 
examined using the Cronbach’s alpha value for each of the specified constructs.  Many 
social science professionals, as a rule of thumb, require a Cronbach's alpha reliability 
score of 0.70 or higher.44  Cronbach's alpha is viewed as a measure of how well the sum 
score of the selected items capture the expected score for the larger domain, even if that 
domain is heterogeneous.  The results of the reliability analysis are displayed in Table 3 
below.  The Cronbach’s Alpha values ranged between .073 and .095, exhibiting more 
than adequate reliability.  
To evaluate the instrument’s discriminate validity, principal component analysis 
was performed using a varimax with rotation.  Discriminate validity is satisfactory when 
items show low loading on other constructs.  Each component showed an eigenvalue 
greater than 1.0, the standard threshold for factor analysis.  Ideally, all the components 
would load on separate factors and achieve an eigenvalue greater than 1.0.  This did not 
                                                 
44 Wikipedia page on Cronbach’s Alpha, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cronbach's_alpha, accessed 




occur.  However, the purpose of this research was to better understand the level of 
variance explained by variables impacting the Technological, Social, and Organizational 
constructs within the context of the TAM and as applied to the Asymmetrical Software 
Kit, as opposed to improving the model.  When examining the variance explained by 
factors influencing PU and PEOU, both a sample size of 25 and higher than expected 
correlations between independent variables may be affecting the level of variance 
explained. 
Linear regression in SPSS was used to examine the relationships within the 
Technological, Organizational, and Social constructs of the TAM  The hypothesized 
relationships delineated in this model were shown, by examining Beta Coefficient and 
Significance, to explain a significant portion of the variance in all three constructs.  
C. RESPONDENT DEMOGRAPHICS 
The overwhelming majority of our respondents (97%) were males, over the age of 
30 and with 12 or more years of service in the Army.  Most of these were senior Non-
Commissioned Officers (NCO’s) and Warrant Officers.  They were split evenly between 
Military Intelligence (MI) and Special Forces Military Occupational Skills (MOS’s).  On 
a whole, they were very well educated, with 82.4% having some college, and 34.2% 
having a College or Postgraduate degree.  They are familiar with computers and use them 
regularly:  94.4% used their personal computer at least once a day, and 97.3% used their 
work computers once a day or more.  A full 65% of the respondents indicated they had a 
year or more of experience using the ASK.  For system training, 39.4% received their 
training on the ASK from the 18F/ Special Forces Intelligence Sergeant Course (SFISC), 
a 12 week course at Ft. Bragg, NC.  Of the remaining respondents, 7.9% indicated they 
had received the two-week course from the New Equipment Training Team.  Fully 52.7% 
of the respondents had received either no formal training, or only received On the Job 
Training (OJT) from their fellow analysts or supervisors. 
Most of the respondents interact with computers at work and at home on an 




respectively.  This indicates they use computers at home at least once a day, and use 
computers at work more than three to five times a day.   Respondents were also asked to 
rank their usage of the components in the ASK (Orion Magic, Analyst Notebook, and 
ArcGIS).  The table below displays their responses.  A preponderance of the respondents 
used the software less than once a day.  For Orion Magic and ArcGIS respectively, 64.8% 
and 52.6% rarely or never used the programs.  The mean scores for component usage 
were low.  ArcGIS and Analysts scored a mean reported usage of 2.8 each, which equates 




Figure 13.   ASK Component Usage 
D. QUALITATIVE FEEDBACK: 
 The survey contained three questions at the end requesting qualitative feedback 
on the ASK.  The following are a sample of their responses to these questions.  A 








1. “What features of the ASK do you like most?  Why?” 
- ArcGIS - industry leader to allow for utilization of GIS information. We need 
software that allows us to conduct analysis of a digital COP. ANB - very versatile 
application for link analysis. GeoRover - Makes utilizing ArcGIS a WHOLE LOT easier 
and much more efficient. 
- Orion Magic is a great help to researching local databases. ARCGIS has 
practical application in my job. Analyst Notebook helps to visualize intelligence 
reporting. 
- Orion Magic is one of the best search tools I have worked with. The problem is 
access to all the databases 
- I like ArcGIS for producing integrating data, performing analysis and producing 
shape files and databases; however, simpler more intuitive tools may be more useful for 
most common tasks related to spatial visualization (IE: Google Earth, etc). Allowing both 
spatial capabilities may bridge the gap between analysts and operators. 
 
2. “What features of the ASK do you like the least? Why?” 
- ArcGIS is not easy to use, and requires extensive training. ArcGIS only works 
with powerful computers which combat units do not have. Finally, no help is provided to 
the users.  
- I detest Analyst Notebook because link charts become too crowded; charts 
cannot be easily searched for key words; and system does not allow for true social 
network analysis functions. I would recommend exploring and developing alternative 
link-analysis platforms. 
- ARCmap has too many features and too many different ways to do the same 
thing. This makes the program bigger and harder to use. When my PC locks up I can 






3. “What suggestions do you have for future improvements to the ASK 
concept?” 
- We need better computers, better training, and Imbedded support before and 
during deployments. 
- Bn S3's, S2's, and Officers who will be commanders at BN and Group level need 
to be familiar with ASK so they can effectively work with Intel fusion. It is very 
disheartening to spend over 100 man hours doing a 130pg SODARS with photo's, link 
charts, and ARCmap products to have it locked in the safe by your S3 CW4 that you 
submit it too so it is never accessible/searchable/submitted to the portal, or useful to 
anyone. 
- The concept of mapping people, places things and events across time and space 
is solid. However, the process requires re-design to ensure accessibility and acceptance. 
Recommend redesigning simple and intuitive data-centric systems based on technologies 
which present low barriers to entry and learning. 
E. RESULTS OF QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS  
1. Previous Research 
 When Hu, Lin, and Chen ran their study on software acceptance in a Law 
Enforcement context, their findings suggested a “prominent core influence path from 
efficiency gain to perceived usefulness and then to intention to accept.”45  Lin also noted 
that “Perceived usefulness appears to be the single most acceptance driver for law 
enforcement officers, showing a highly prominent and significant direct effect on 
behavioral intention.”46  They also found the insignificance of perceived ease of use on 
perceived usefulness indicated a professional orientation amongst officers that had been 
                                                 
45 Paul Hu, Cjienting Lin, & H. Chen, User acceptance of Intelligence and Security Informatics 
technology: A study of COPLINK, Journal of the American Society for Information Science and 
Technology, 2005; 56(3)  p. 242. 
46 Chienting Lin, Examining Technology Usability and Acceptance in Digital Government: A Case 




suggested by earlier research.47  They also found subjective norm had a significant effect 
on acceptance decision-making, but that normative beliefs themselves did not lead 
directly to user acceptance.48 
2 Results of this Study 
In this study, Perceived Usefulness exists, along with Perceived Ease of Use in 
the Technological context.  The mean value of Perceived Usefulness was 5.550, meaning 
users perceived the ASK to be somewhat useful software.  The mean of Job Relevance 
was 5.140 and Product Quality was 5.190.  Efficiency Gain (EG) was 4.933, indicating 
the respondents may perceive a net loss of efficiency if they have to spend an inordinate 
amount of time manipulating an overly cumbersome system.  This theme was carried 
over in the qualitative responses and during the interviews at Ft. Bragg.   Using linear 
regression, a coefficient of determination (R2) and a regression coefficient (Beta) were 
determined for the model.  For Perceived Usefulness, the adjusted R2 value was .716.  Job 
Relevance and Product Quality were the most important factors.  Efficiency Gain only 
had a small effect on Perceived Usefulness, and External Connectivity had little to no 
bearing on Perceived Usefulness. 
These results show that Hypotheses Two (The level of job relevance of the ASK 
as perceived by the tactical users will positively affect their perceived usefulness of the 
ASK) and Three (The level of product quality of the ASK as perceived by the tactical 
users will positively affect their perceived usefulness of the ASK.) were shown to be 
valid.  Hypothesis One: (The level of efficiency gain of the ASK as perceived by the 
tactical users will positively affect their perceived usefulness of the ASK.) and 
Hypothesis 4: The level of external data connectivity of the ASK as perceived by the 
tactical users will positively affect their perceived usefulness of the ASK.) were found 
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not to correlate as strongly.  Statistically, Job Relevance and Product Quality are the two 
strongest determinants of Perceived Usefulness. 
 
Construct Item Mean STD Cronbach’s  ά 
PU-1 5.480 1.610 
PU-2 5.600 1.154 
PU-3 5.560 1.325 Perceived Utility (PU) 
PU-4 5.560 1.416 
0.958 
EG-1 4.880 1.301 
EG-2 5.040 1.513 
Efficiency Gain (EG) 
EG-3 4.880 1.452 
0.801 
JOBR-1 4.920 1.497 
JOBR-2 5.200 1.554 
JOBR-3 4.880 1.536 
Job Relevance (JOBR) 
JOBR-4 5.560 1.157 
0.821 
PRODQ-1 5.720 1.137 
PRODQ-2 5.240 1.588 
PRODQ-3 4.400 1.755 
Product Quality 
(PRODQ) 
PRODQ-4 5.400 1.527 
0.821 
 
Table 2.   Reliability Analysis for Perceived Usefulness 
 
The mean score for Perceived Ease of Use was 4.690.  The system is not 
perceived to be more than moderately easy to use.  For Functionality and Learn ability, 
the mean scores 4.246 and 4.680 respectively.  This indicates users found the ASK 
moderately functional in its layout, and rated their prospect of learning how to use the 
system at somewhat better than average.  Of the factors bearing on Perceived Ease of 
Use, Functionality and Learn ability were the most important determinants of Perceived 
Ease of Use,  Functionality correlated to Perceived Ease of Use at .841 and Learn ability 
correlated at .680.   
Hypotheses Six (The level of functionality of the ASK as perceived by the tactical 
users will positively affect their perceived ease of use of the ASK.) and Seven (The level 
of learn ability of the ASK as perceived by the tactical users will positively affect their 
perceived ease of use of the ASK.) were proven to have a statistically significant 
correlation.  They are the strongest determinants of Perceived Ease of Use.  Hypothesis 
Five (The level of external data connectivity of the ASK as perceived by the tactical users 




uncorrelated to both factors in the Technological Construct.  External Connectivity, while 
important to users, has no bearing on either Perceived Usefulness or Perceived Ease of 
Use.  
 
Construct Item Mean STD Cronbach’s  ά 
PEOU-1 4.080 1.552 
PEOU-2 4.880 1.394 
PEOU-3 4.800 1.471 
Perceived Ease of Use 
(PEOU) 
PEOU-4 5.000 1.384 
0.875 
FUNC-1 4.480 1.636 
FUNC-2 4.320 1.700 
FUNC-3 4.360 1.680 Functionality (FUNC) 
FUNC-4 3.880 1.763 
0.905 
LEARN-1 4.760 1.640 
LEARN-2 4.720 1.882 
LEARN-3 4.800 1.290 Learn ability (LEARN) 
LEARN-4 4.440 1.709 
0.739 
EXCON-1 5.320 2.267 
EXCON-2 5.680 1.651 
EXCON-3 5.720 2.051 
External Connectivity 
(EXCON) 
EXCON-4 5.360 2.215 
0.759 
 































(##)= Beta Coefficient  




The mean of Subjective Norm was 4.400, indicating an overall moderate to weak 
influence of peers and leaders in influencing adoption behavior.  Peer Influence mean 
was 4.733, and Chain of Command influence mean was 5.040.  Users are influenced by 
their peers to a moderate extent, but not by their Chain of Command.  Peer Influence 
correlates to Subjective Norm at .592, but Chain of Command influence correlates at -
.004.  Tactical level SOF users are trained to work in small groups and rely on each for 
their survival.  It is not surprising that soldiers trained to this extent would hold the 
opinions of their peers in higher regard than the opinions of their supervisors.  It is very 
likely that command influence in a SOF unit is not as important a driver in a SOF unit as 
it would be in a conventional Army unit, but this bears further research. 
Hypothesis Eight (The level of peer influence (PEER) as perceived by the tactical 
users will positively affect the intensity of their perceived subjective norm towards 
accepting the ASK.) proved a statistically significant correlation.  Conversely, 
Hypothesis Nine (The level of command (COC) involvement as perceived by the tactical 
users will positively affect the intensity of their perceived subjective norm towards 
accepting the ASK.) correlated negatively.  This may, as mentioned earlier, be a function 
of the way in which Special Operations Soldiers are trained to operate in small, self 
sufficient units far from the direct command and control exercised by many conventional 
military commands. 
 
Construct Item Mean STD Cronbach’s  ά 
SN-1 5.280 1.369 Subjective Norm (SN) SN-2 5.320 1.405 0.733 
COC-1 5.320 1.405 
COC-2 5.360 1.150 
COC-3 5.400 1.554 
Chain of Command 
(COC) 
COC-4 5.280 1.458 
0.741 
PEER-1 5.400 1.290 
PEER-2 4.920 1.605 
Peer (PEER) 
PEER-3 3.880 1.877 
0.363 
 
















(##)= Beta Coefficient  
Figure 15.   Social Construct Regression Values 
 
In the Organizational construct, respondents displayed a Behavioral Intent to use 
mean of 5.346.  This indicates a slightly positive intent to use the system.  Support had a 
mean score of 4.040, indicating a neutral opinion of the support mechanisms for the 
software.  Training also scored a mean of 4.550, which is neutral.  However, when you 
reanalyze the data, SOF MOS soldiers scored a mean of 4.43 for Training, while MI 
MOS soldiers scored a mean of 4.64.  This demonstrates a slight disparity in the 
perception of the training soldiers receive.  System Availability scored in the negative 
region, with a mean of 3.160.  Soldiers clearly thought system availability and finding 
enough computers appropriate to run the software were problem facing their acceptance 
of the system.  These concerns were born out in the qualitative feedback from the survey.  
For Behavioral Intent, Training and Support were the most important factors.  Training 
correlated to Behavioral Intent at .498, and Support correlated at .310.  The adjusted R-




low scores predict a likelihood of marginal ASK use by the respondents.  This is born out 
in the usage data and the comments from the qualitative data. 
Hypothesis Ten (The level of system availability as perceived by the tactical users 
will positively affect the intensity of their behavioral intention towards accepting the 
ASK.) did not correlate strongly, although respondents did express much concern over 
the systems.  Hypotheses Eleven (The quality of training as perceived by the tactical 
users will positively affect the intensity of their behavioral intention towards accepting 
the ASK.) and Twelve (The level of support as perceived by the tactical users will 
positively affect the intensity of their behavioral intention towards accepting the ASK.)  
proved the strongest correlations with Behavioral Intent.  Training and Support, in that 
order, were the most important determinants. 
 
Construct Item Mean STD Cronbach’s  ά 
AV-1 2.800 1.527 
AV-2 3.480 1.782 
AV-3 3.000 1.607 Availability (AV) 
AV-4 3.360 1.468 
0.786 
SPT-1 4.040 2.051 
SPT-2 4.120 1.943 
Support (SPT) 
SPT-3 3.960 1.881 
0.864 
TNG-1 4.480 1.837 
TNG-2 4.280 1.744 
TNG-3 5.240 1.200 
Training (TNG) 
TNG-4 4.200 1.658 
0.753 
 



















(##)= Beta Coefficient  
Figure 16.   Organizational Construct Regression Values 
 
F CONCLUSIONS AND DISCUSSION 
Findings from this analysis have several implications for research and technology 
fielding practices in the military context.  The analysis suggests that Perceived 
Usefulness appears to be the most important acceptance driver for users at the Tactical 
level.  Job Relevance and Product Quality were the two most significant drivers of 
Perceived Usefulness, suggesting that users may anchor their acceptance decision from a 
utility perspective.  This was very similar to findings with law-enforcement officers and 
the COPLINK software.49   
Second, Peer Influence seem to be the strongest driver of Subjective Norm.  
When assessing the utility of the ASK, Soldiers are likely to take into account the 
opinions of many people.  What is significant here is that the Chain of Command held 
                                                 
49 Chienting Lin, Examining Technology Usability and Acceptance in Digital Government: A Case 




almost no sway in a soldier’s decision.  This may be due to the command’s lack of 
involvement with, or knowledge about the ASK. 
Finally, while System Availability is perceived as a problem among the 
respondents, it is not a significant driver of Behavioral Intent to use.  Respondents had a 
lot to say about the availability and appropriateness of their computers in both pre-survey 
interviews at Ft. Bragg and in the qualitative portion of the survey itself.  Training and 
technical Support for the ASK are, however, significant aspects.  As noted before, there is 
a difference in perceptions of training amongst the respondents, and it’s split along MOS 
lines.  Respondents also mentioned a perceived lack of dedicated tech support for the 
system, which hampered their efforts at proficiency during pre-mission train up cycles. 
Design and use of collaborative Intelligence analysis software like the ASK can 
greatly enhance the war fighting capabilities of SOF units.  Any unit adopting new 
technology must carefully manage that process to reap the full benefit of the innovation.  
Driven by a need to explore technology acceptance by Tactical level users, this study 
designed and empirically tested a model for explaining individual users acceptance of the 
ASK.  Overall, the model showed a good fit with the survey data collected, and it 
exhibited satisfactory explanatory power to most of the acceptance decisions observed.  
These findings will help instructors, software designers, and leaders design systems and 



















V.  RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS 
A. OVERVIEW 
From the beginning, the purpose of this research has been to identify those factors 
relating to user acceptance of the Asymmetrical Software Kit (ASK).  This chapter will 
summarize the research, examine the implications of significant findings, and identify 
opportunities for continued research in this field.  The Technology Acceptance Model 
(TAM) results for this study are summarized, and some implications for further TAM 
usage are delineated.  Finally, based off all the analysis, recommendations are given for 
continued training, fielding, and evolution of the ASK and the systems that will succeed 
it. 
With a better understanding of the key drivers of user acceptance for the tactical-
level user, leaders, trainers, and procurement/futures professionals can quickly identify 
areas where user acceptance is currently being hindered, and likely to be hindered in the 
future.  They can then plan acquisition, information, and training programs to erode these 
barriers and ensure a swift, smooth fielding and adoption.  User training should 
concentrate on increasing Perceived Utility, as this is demonstrably the most important 
acceptance driver for ASK users.  A utility centric view of technology is consistent with 
the findings of other research, and explains the insignificant effect of ease of use on 
Behavioral intent50.  It follows that users would not find an innovation useful simply 
because it is easy to use.   Cultivating both peer and Chain of Command support for the 
new technology can create a normative reinforcement that encourages user acceptance as 
well.  While this may not lead directly to acceptance, it can influence an individual 
analyst’s assessment of an innovation’s usefulness. 
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The intention of this research has been to use the findings to aid in the 
modification and management of the current Asymmetrical Software Kit, as well as the 
design and implementation of future software packages of this nature. 
1 System Training (TNG):  
Training, according to the results of the survey, is the number one discriminator 
for intent to use (BI).  Military Intelligence (MI) soldiers who received their training 
through the Mobile Training Team or On the Job Training displayed a lower intent to use, 
a lower PEOU, a lower PU, and had a much lower perception of the value of the training 
they received on the system.  This stands in stark contrast to the Special Forces Soldiers 
(MOS 18F and 180A), most of whom received their training through the Special Forces 
Intelligence Sergeants Course (SFISC).  Their responses were the antithesis of the 
responses from MI soldiers.  While both of them must use the system to communicate 
and share intelligence at the Tactical level, they do not receive the same training.  The 
SFISC is a 12 week course that uses the ASK the entire time.  The POI focuses on using 
the system in all aspects of the 18F’s job, and leads to a capstone project.51  The capstone 
is a culmination of their instruction on the ASK.  Teams analyze immense amounts of 
real-world intelligence data and draw conclusions about active military conflicts.  Some 
of these projects have discovered groundbreaking information and assisted the GWOT 
greatly. 
The disparity between the training the 18F’s receive in the SFISC and the training 
the MI soldiers receive is alarming, and may be the single largest driver in the disparity 
between their perceptions of the system and the adoption rates of the ASK.  The disparity 
doesn’t have to exist, and much of that could be solved through similar, consistent, and 
cooperative training on the system.  The current SFISC proposal to fix this problem is to 
have contractors teach their POI to MI soldiers and replicate the 18F course at another 
                                                 




location.  On the MI side of the house, the USASOC G2 has a project in concept stages 
called the ARSOF Military Intelligence Assignment Oriented Training (AOT) Initiative.  
This AOT is designed to provide incoming MI soldiers an in-depth training package to 
prepare them for the unique demands of the Army SOF environment.52 
The recommendation of this author is that the proposals be combined.  The SFISC 
would change to the Special Forces Intelligence Course, or SFIC.  This training would 
include all MI MOS’s with the 18F’s to standardize unify the training they receive on the 
ASK.  It is, after all, the system designed to help them analyze and communicate Tactical 
intelligence.  USASOC trains communications equipment in a collaborative environment.  
Signal soldiers sit in the same classroom as the Special Forces Communication Sergeants 
(18E’s) and work together to establish communications.  I would only be natural that the 
Special Forces Intelligence Sergeants should attend the same training as the Military 
Intelligence Soldiers that support them.  The POI for the MI Soldiers could cover the new 
and unique expectations they will face, and the courses on the ASK could be a combined 
effort.  MI soldiers and the 18F’s could collaborate on the capstone project, and use the 
ASK to piece together real world intelligence from ongoing conflicts and produce 
realistic products as they would do in combat.  This would serve many ends.  They MI 
and Special Forces MOS Soldiers would train together on the system they use on a daily 
basis to build their confidence in the system.  Their collaboration would also boost their 
confidence in each others abilities, and promote trust in the soldiers they will have to 
work with on a daily basis.  The relationships forged in these joint training environments 
are proven to be very strong bonds. 
2 Command Influence – Subjective Norm (SN):  
In “Best Practices in Counterinsurgency,” Kalev Sepp wrote that, “Intelligence 
operations that help detect terrorist insurgents for arrest and prosecution are the single 
most important practice to protect a population from threats to its security.”53  This is a 
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G2 SGM about the AOT initiative. 




change in the norm for many classically trained Intelligence professionals.  According to 
Les Grau, a respected Counter-Insurgency theorist, Intelligence necessary for fighting 
insurgents is a radical shift, and a lot of change to swallow.  “The military intelligence 
effort devoted to combating…insurgency has little in common with conventional 
intelligence operations in support of conventional maneuver war. Intelligence preparation 
of the battlefield, order of battle, templating forces, signals intelligence; measurement and 
signature intelligence; and electronic intelligence take different forms or are not 
applicable. The S2 or G2 has a different type of war and needs to take a different 
approach to dealing with it, much as the U.S. approach to peacekeeping evolved during 
the past decade.”54  Any change this large demands command involvement at a level 
even more than would be normally necessary to simply shepherd an innovation.  This 
change isn’t just about a new system, it’s about a whole new way of analyzing 
Intelligence. 
When infusing a new innovation into an organization, military units need to plan 
and execute software fielding like a corporation.  The current fielding model often ends at 
the purchase of software, neglecting several key steps to gain user buy-in.  According to 
John P. Kotter, organizational transformations, including adoption of new software, can 
be fraught with peril.  He studied eight factors that controlled success or failure of 
adaptation: Not enough sense of urgency, Not Creating a Powerful Enough Coalition, 
Lacking a Vision, Under communicating the Vision by a Factor of Ten, Not Removing 
Obstacles to the Vision, Not Systematically Planning for and Creating Short-Term Wins, 
Declaring Victory Too Soon, and Not Anchoring Changes in the Organization’s 
Culture.55  This data has shown that Chain of Command as having no correlation 
whatsoever to users acceptance decisions.  It is obvious in this instance that the Chains of 
Command have under-communicated their vision, declared victory after fielding, and not 
institutionalized (anchored) this innovation in their organizational culture. 
                                                 
54 Lester Grau, Something Old, Something New: Guerrillas, Terrorists, and Intelligence Analysis, 
Military Review, July-August 2004, accessed on 10 December 2007 from Small Wars Journal website at 
http://www.smallwarsjournal.com/documents/grau.pdf. 
55 John P. Kotter, “Leading Change: Why Transformation Efforts Fail,”  Harvard Business Review, 




The results of measuring the Subjective Norm (SN) in this study show that 
leadership in USASOC is not a strong influence in Soldiers decisions to adopt the ASK.  
Peers, immediate supervisors, and the entire Chain of Command should be very 
important social influences on an operator, but they are not involved enough in this 
transformation of Intelligence.  Educating the leadership about the benefits of the ASK, 
and helping them understand the importance of using the system is paramount.  The 
Chain of Command must also mandate usage across the board, and remove old systems 
to assist in adoption.  Hartwick and Barki found that mandatory usage was significantly 
related to Intention to Use.  Mandatory users give greater weight to the opinions of 
others, using the system more frequently when their leadership thinks that usage is 
appropriate.56  In a military environment, a change like this should be simple enough.  
The chain of command can mandate usage of the ASK and have the legacy systems 
removed from the computers.  In fact, many of the survey respondents and soldiers 
interviewed at Ft. Bragg admitted they still used Falconview, an older and simpler GIS, 
because their peers still used it and the Chain of Command tacitly supported this choice.  
Wilson stated that “Tasks that are familiar, easy, professionally rewarded, or well adapted 
to the circumstances in which the operators find themselves will be preferred because 
performing them is less costly than undertaking tasks that are new, difficult, or 
professionally unrewarded or that place the operator in conflict with his or her own 
environment.”57  By demanding the Soldiers produce their Intelligence products with the 
ASK and removing competing systems like Falconview, commanders can greatly affect 
adoption rates in their units.  These changes have to be swift and visible to all users, lest 
users continue to ignore the innovations around them. 
One of the suggestions brought out in the interviews was for the commanders to 
institute a weekly briefing.  It was suggested that the program be called “Fox Friday” (for 
the 18 F Intel Sergeant MOS), and that the 18F’s and the MI Soldiers of the S2 (Intel) 
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Management Science, Vol 40, (4), April 1994, pp. 440-465. 
57 J. Wilson, Bureaucracy: What Government Agencies Do and Why They Do It, New York, Basic 




collaborate on a weekly briefing to the entire Battalion Chain of Command.  A routine 
like this will do several things.  First, it will demonstrate command knowledge of the 
system, and expectations of system use.  Second, a program like this will go a long ways 
towards positively anchoring system usage in the culture of the unit and ensuring that 
new users are brought into the fold as they enter the unit.  Having the SOF and MI MOS 
soldiers collaborate in a weekly preparation and briefing will cause them to work together 
towards a common goal, and strengthen trust and working relationships to stand the 
stresses of combat. 
3 System Availability (AV):  
The mean score for questions of system availability belied an overall negative 
impression of the number and type of systems available to run the software.  Many of the 
respondents to the survey noted that there were concerns with both system availability, 
and system suitability.  Soldiers expressed concerns that the number of systems their 
units were issued were insufficient to cover each and every user, and that many of the 
systems the ASK was loaded on were not fast enough to run complex, memory intensive 
programs like ArcGIS. 
During interviews at Ft. Bragg, one Warrant Officer admitted that he had upgrade 
the laptop by purchasing enough RAM and a fast enough processor for his 18F to use the 
system.  His detachment CF-50 (Panasonic Toughbook Laptop) was two years old, had 
survived three rotations to Southern Afghanistan and was no longer performing at the 
level necessary to run memory intensive programs like ArcGIS without crashing.  
Another senior NCO noted that, during the SFISC, the computers they use are state of the 
art desktops maintained in a lab environment.  They are hard-wired together and pull data 
and imagery off a dedicated server.  Once he returned to his unit, his ASK laptop could 
not match the performance of the computers in the lab, and that he was greatly frustrated 
by this. One respondent even suggested using a COTS gaming computer like an 




Issues like these have serious impacts on user acceptance, and can be easily 
remedied by updating Basis of Issue to reflect real needs, proper acquisition (with end 
user input) and property accountability. 
C. CONCURRENT RESEARCH: 
This project is only the first in a series being executed by the Naval Postgraduate 
School’s Common Operational Research Environment (CORE) Lab to investigate further 
improvements that might be made to the ASK.  MAJ Derek McClain will be continuing 
this research, and attempting to identify standardized data models and database formats 
that will facilitate communication and speed analysis across USASOC. 
D. SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER STUDY 
As the problems addressed in this research are corrected and the ASK continues 
to evolve, the program should be evaluated again to examine new and improved features.  
TAM is an extremely effective tool for this type of ongoing evaluation.  Future 
evaluations and scores can be conducted, and system evolution can be contrasted against 
this research as a baseline.  IT is ever changing and evolving, and any lessons learned 
from this analysis require that further evaluation take place as the ASK goes through 
subsequent updates and improvements.  Also, a user’s beliefs and attitude towards an 
innovation are likely to change and evolve over time.58  Therefore, it will be important to 
measure both initial acceptance, as well as continued acceptance of the system.  New 
information technologies are continually being introduced to the community that could 
benefit from acceptance theory testing.  Outside the realm of evaluating a new bit of 
software for the command, the ASK concept presents a plethora of IT management issues 
that could be studied and researched. 
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Design and use of advanced analytic technologies is paramount to enhancing the 
capabilities of USASOC Intelligence assets in the GWOT.  To ensure these technologies 
are adopted and utilized to the fullest extent, the adopting units must manage user 
acceptance in the design, testing, fielding, and adoption.  Motivated by the lack of 
previous research in this area, this study developed and empirically tested a model for 
explaining tactical-level users’ acceptance of the Asymmetrical Software Kit.  Overall, 
the model demonstrated a good fit with the data collected, and exhibited satisfactory 
explanatory power to the technology acceptance decisions observed among Tactical level 
users of the ASK. 
The ASK was designed to enhance the analytic capabilities of the Special 
Operations Soldiers at the Tactical level of the GWOT.  In light of the continuing 
fighting, and new and developing fronts in this “long war,” effective adoption strategies 
for needed innovations are especially crucial.  Complex innovations that are rapidly 
fielded during wartime need special attention paid to their implementation lest they wind 
up expensive trinkets locked in a safe and forgotten. 
Intelligence analysis is an extremely complex series of tasks that have to be 
continuously coordinated.  Recent advances in software have produced several tools that 
have excellent potential for application to the analysis and production process.  The 
programs in the ASK have many tools and functions that make analysis easier and more 
effective for Intelligence professionals.  To make full use of this concept, we must train 
ASK users together, to a common standard of interoperability, give them computers that 
are fast enough, and educate the Chain of Command to make use of the ASK a priority 
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